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This paper examines the effect of two psychological attributes, namely an individual’s 
risk and time preference, on withdrawal decisions. Our sample is a pool of prime 
depositors in Indonesia, mainly due to the country’s deposit market being heavily 
concentrated on such depositors. We find that most of the prime depositors are risk 
averse long-term depositors. The regression results show that there is a significant 
correlation between the decision to withdraw and individual risk and time preference 
in most economic shock scenarios. The study concludes that a bank-run could happen 
if the rupiah depreciates by approximately 27% (from Rp 13,436 to Rp 17,000) and 
when there is a medium or a large bank failure.
Article history:
Received  : September 10, 2018
Revised  : November 02, 2018
Accepted  : March 03, 2019
Available online : February 29, 2020
https://doi.org/10.21098/bemp.v23i1.954
Keywords: Withdrawal decision; Time preference; Risk preference; Bank run; Prime depositors.
JEL Classification: D81; G02; G21.
ABSTRACT
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 23, Number 1, 2020140
I. INTRODUCTION 
While previous studies on bank runs and financial insolvency are primarily based 
on macroeconomic and theoretical approaches, the behavior of economic agents, 
particularly their risk and time preferences, has not been much explored. At the 
individual level, however, the role of the two behavioral aspects is very prominent 
during decision-making situations. Individuals with different risk preferences 
make different decisions under uncertainty (Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Powell and 
Ansic, 1997; Charness and Gneezy, 2012). Similarly, individuals with different 
time preferences make different decisions weighing up future benefits (Khwaja et 
al, 2007; Burks et al, 2012).
We argue that decisions on whether to withdraw money from respective banks 
under financial shocks yield similar tradeoffs for depositors. They would judge 
whether the situation is too risky or not, and whether future benefits outweigh 
present benefits if they withdraw now compare to later. With this set up, depositors 
would jointly determine the insolvency situation in idiosyncratic cases.
Indonesia depicts a rather interesting case regarding depositors. Table 1 
and 2 show the concentration of deposit market. Table 3 shows characteristics 
of depositors. In Table 1, it can be noted that the commercial banking system is 
dominated by four biggest banks (classified as BUKU 4 banks) whose total share is 
49 percent (OJK, 2015). To put this into a proper perspective, just above fifty percent 
of the remaining market share is competed by the rest of the market (OJK, 2015). It 
is also very interesting to know that a staggering 70.6 percent of the total fund in 
the banking system is owned by only 0.57 percent of all depositors (Nuryakin and 
Massie, 2018). We call them the prime depositors, and these are mostly individuals 
with deposit of Rp500 million (approximately US$37,500) or more. 
Table 1. 
Concentration of Deposit Market in Indonesia (All Banks), December 2015
This table has information on the concentration of deposit market in Indonesia. Deposit nominal values are reported 
against number of accounts (and proportion) and savings (in currency value terms and proportion). Finally, * denotes 
500 million rupiah is the threshold for prime depositor classification and ** denotes 2 billion rupiah is the maximum 
insured deposit amount. 
Nominal (in Rupiah)
Number of Accounts Saving
Number Percent (IDR Trillion) Percent
Up to 100 Million 171,486,517 97.71 668.16 14.93
> 100 M s/d 200 M 1,809,429 1.03 253.98 5.68
> 200 M s/d 500 M* 1,221,578 0.70 393.94 8.81
> 500 M s/d 1 Billion 500,738 0.29 369.85 8.27
> 1 B s/d 2 B** 252,082 0.14 359.36 8.03
> 2 B s/d 5 B 150,446 0.09 467.87 10.46
> 5 B 81,126 0.05 1,960.64 43.83
 175,501,916 100 4,473.77 100
Source: Nuryakin and Massie (2018); Indonesia Deposit Insurance Company (LPS).
Based on this information, we argue that policymakers and researchers should 
pay more attention to the behavior of prime depositors. With this argument, our 
study focuses on estimating the time and risk preferences of the prime depositors 
in Indonesia and examining whether they influence withdrawal decisions under 
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financial shocks. By eliciting these two behavioral attributes of depositors, we 
provide a better picture regarding the vulnerability of the Indonesian banking 
system to bank runs. 
Intuitively, if prime depositors are risk-averse then a small shock to the 
economy would lead them to withdraw their deposits. Under normal conditions, 
prime depositors with different time preferences will have different pattern of 
withdrawals. However, it is obvious that when many of these individuals decide 
to withdraw, then, a bank run will potentially occur, and this is the hypothesis of 
our paper.
Empirically, we can predict the insolvency of a bank two years earlier. As 
pointed by Jordan (2000), when uninsured depositors start to cash out, the bank 
will start to crumble about two years before it eventually become insolvent. For 
the Indonesian case, the limit of deposit insurance is Rp2 billion (approximately 
US$150,000), meaning that depositors are technically uninsured. 
Therefore, it is interesting that very few studies are available on the behavior 
of prime depositors. One reason could be the difficulty of collecting the data. This 
could explain why the few existing studies mostly use experimental methods; 
see for example, Dijk (2017), Kiss, Rodriguez-Lara, and Rosa-Garcia (2018), and 
Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009). 
We hypothesize that time and risk preferences of prime depositors affect 
withdrawal decisions, which, in turn, determines the occurrence of bank runs. 
To test our hypothesis, we interviewed 33 prime depositors based on predefined 
questionnaire (perception and real data). We utilize a logistic regression model to 
analyze the effect of time and risk preferences on the decision to withdraw. 
We find that prime depositors in Indonesia tend to maintain their deposits in 
banks over a longer period (i.e. they are long-term depositors). On the alarming 
side, most of the depositors are risk averse, and, hence, are sensitive to the shocks. 
We show that the risk and time preferences significantly affect withdrawal 
decisions. On the one hand, demonstration effect or information cascade will 
create bank runs. On the other hand, the small bank failure or Rupiah depreciation 
to Rp15,000 per USD will not create bank runs. 
Our paper differs from existing ones in several aspects. First, we examine 
the real market players (prime depositors), while studies such as Dijk (2017) 
and Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009) considered university students, and Kiss, 
Rodriguez-Lara and Rosa-Garcia (2018) focused on the general public. Second, 
we examined withdrawal decisions under different hypothesized scenarios, 
while existing studies examined withdrawal decisions under different emotional 
priming (see, for example, Dijk (2017).
The next section reviews the literature. Section III discusses the data and 
methodology, while Section IV presents the results. Section V presents the 
conclusion. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Diamond and Dyvbig Model
Our study is inspired by the theoretical framework developed by Diamond and 
Dyvbig (1983), commonly shortened as D&D model. To be specific, we employed 
the modified D&D model presented in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005). 
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The setup of the model assumes three periods in the economy. At the current 
period (t = 0), all depositors choose the bank as their respective endowments. 
Period 1 (t = 1) is the time in the near future, while period 2 (t = 2) would be a time 
in the longer horizon. There are two agents involved: the bank’s customers and the 
bank itself. Each bank is in autarkic state or is independent. 
Banks offer risk sharing to the customer—that is, a demand-deposit contract 
and longer-term loans altogether, and contracts for their customers. The former 
serves as liquid liabilities, while the latter acts as an illiquid asset. This puts the 
bank into a condition, in which they have to pay any withdrawals of demand-
deposit contract anytime the customers want to. Furthermore, banks cannot ask 
for the loans’ repayments as if the loans have longer maturity or because the 
customers cannot repay the loans immediately. In normal circumstances, this 
set up is normal as the withdrawals are stochastic and relatively insignificant 
compared to the ready-to-use reserves of the banks. 
Bank customers are classified into two types, namely patient customers, and 
impatient customers. The impatient customers will withdraw in the short time 
(t=1) due to liquidity shocks. On the contrary, the patient customers will wait until 
the maturity of their deposits, hence, opting to withdraw in the distant future 
(t = 2). When there are changes in the fundamentals, the patient customers could 
also withdraw at t = 1. The proportion of the impatient customers is λ, and the 
proportion of the patient customers is  such that: 
We need to modify Equation (3) to accommodate the patient customers who decide 
to withdraw in the first period: 
(1)
Bank customers can withdraw their money anytime. The utility function of the 
whole population would then be:
Equation (2) shows that the total welfare of the society would be equal to the 
utility gained by the impatient customers (i.e. first term on the right-hand side) plus 
the utility of the patient customers (i.e. second term). θ represents the possibility 
of the economy failing. Similarly, the inverse or complementary probability of 
θ = pc(θ) = 1 – p(θ) represents the probability of bank runs. Empirically, p(θ) is 
hardly known. 
Recall that Equation (2) resembles the total welfare of the economy in terms of 
inter-temporal withdrawals. Focusing on first period, we have: 
(2)
(3)
(4)
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Equation (4) shows that a proportion of (n – λ) were initially patient customers (ρ) 
but consumes in period 1, where n is the actual proportion of people withdrawing. 
We can rewrite the equation as:
(5)
Equation (5) replaces λ with n, indicating that the proportion of withdrawers 
could be bigger than the impatient customers (added by the patient customers). 
In the Diamond and Dyvbig (1983) model, there could be a case of multiple 
equilibria; the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ equilibria. For the ‘good’ equilibrium, only 
impatient customers (faced with liquidity shocks) will withdraw in the first period 
(as much as λ). The equilibrium is good for the economy, since only stochastic and 
insignificant withdrawals occur and banks have enough reserves to pay. 
In the ‘bad’ equilibrium, the patient customers also withdraw in the first period. 
In this case, the patient customers will withdraw, as the impatient customers 
withdraw. This sparks the sense of panic within the patient customers, every other 
patient customer also withdraws, which leaves the banks with no money. 
Following Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) and Morris and Shin (2001), it is 
possible for the equilibrium to lie between the two extreme scenarios (good and 
bad). To model this, one can introduce a threshold level of θ (or θ*) and perceived 
level of θ (or θ’), which will be the signal for the customer to make decision. 
Previous studies did suggest that this perceived level is virtually possible to be 
calculated or predicted (Allen and Gale, 1998; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005). In this 
paper, we take the advantage of this possibility by directly analyzing the behavior 
of depositors, setting up scenarios to infer θ* and θ’ (withdrawal decisions), and, 
then, examining how the time and risk preferences, amount of deposit, and other 
variables affect these withdrawal decisions. 
B. On Bank Run
A bank run occurs when a large number of withdrawals are made at the same 
time or in a very narrow time window and is significant enough to make one 
bank collapse. The impact of the withdrawals depends on the number of people 
withdrawing and the amount of withdrawals. Generally, the withdrawals are 
due to widespread concerns regarding the performance of related banks and/
or the prevailing economic condition in the country. As one bank collapses, the 
possibility of contagion emerges, paving the way for financial crisis in the country 
(Brown, Trautmann, & Vlahu, 2014).
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) defined bank run as one of the ‘almost ever-
present phenomena’ in the history of monetary crisis around the world. They 
highlighted that as depositors rush to withdraw their money, banks alike would 
find themselves in a ‘bank panic’ position, where they might be forced to fund the 
return of these deposits by selling their assets, notably for a much lower amount 
compared to the normal market price. The 1939 Great Depression in the United 
States is one example of crises predominantly caused by this phenomenon. 
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Regarding this matter, Iyer and Puri (2013) stressed the importance of an 
adequate relationship between depositors and banks. By keeping good relationship 
with depositors, banks can prevent bank runs. In this paper, we argue that this 
strategy needs to consider the time and risk preferences of the depositors. 
This argument was amplified by Brown, Guin, and Morkoetter (2014), who, 
in addition to these factors, identified the role played by switching cost across 
banks in withdrawal decisions. Brown, Guin, and Morkoetter (2014) found that 
there is a high propensity for a household to make withdrawals when their bank 
is under distress. Iyer and Puri (2013) also explained that empirically only a 
moderate number of depositors would come back and redeposit their money into 
their respective banks after cases of bank runs. This implies that bank runs are not 
a short-term problem as they are accompanied by several adverse effects. 
It is widely accepted that bank runs are linked to adverse information in the 
banking system (Schumacher, 2000). They may also be caused by panic among the 
depositors (Chen and Hasan, 2008). In large-scale bank runs, depositors do not 
care if their money is deposited in a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ banks; they simply withdraw 
all their money. 
Recent theoretical works on the subject are extensions of Diamond and 
Dybvig‘s (1983) model. Andolfatto, Nosal, and Sultanum (2017) proposed a 
theoretical model extending the Diamond and Dybvig model allowing depositors 
to ‘circulate rumor’ and investigated the possible equilibrium. On the banking 
system’s side, Kashyap, Tsomocos, and Vardoulakis (2017) made alterations 
that allow banks to choose between liquid and illiquid assets, and also between 
deposits and equity. Closely related to bank runs, Ely (2017) introduced dynamic 
persuasion mechanisms between principals and agents.
Some policies are then proposed to counter the state. Deposit insurance, for 
example, was proven to be an effective strategy to hold depositors from cashing 
out their money (Schotter and Yorulmazer, 2009). The result was alarming 
for Indonesia because the deposit market is highly concentrated on the prime 
depositors. 
Related to deposit insurances, Bijlsma and van der Wiel (2012) studied 
whether a better awareness of deposit insurance affect the withdrawal behavior of 
households. Bijlsma and van der Wiel (2012) found that the increased awareness 
has virtually no effect on households’ behavior. Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009) 
also tested another policy in their work—providing better information to 
depositors about the condition of the banking system. The result is that the more 
symmetric information provided by the banking system, the less likely depositors 
make a rush decision. Those without information also tend to wait for the first 
movers to withdraw their money, then simultaneous withdrawals occur. This is 
also alarming for Indonesia because the country has low financial literacy, and, 
hence, information flow is virtually symmetric. 
Another group of studies utilize macroeconomic models and analyze whether 
monetary policies can help counter the state of the crisis; see among others Pathan, 
Skully, and Wickramanayake (2008) or Choe and Lee (2003). 
More recent studies on bank runs incorporate behavioral aspects of depositors. 
Kiss, Rodriguez-Lara, and Rosa-Garcia (2018) suggest that even with adequate 
fundamentals and coordination among depositors, depositors will still panic 
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and make excessive withdrawals leading to bank runs. Furthermore, depositors 
generally overestimate the occurrence of bank run. Using experimental approach, 
Dijk (2017) conclude that withdrawal decisions are significantly affected by the 
inducement of background emotional states, such as fear, sadness, and happiness. 
What makes our paper different from these studies is that we are relaxing 
the macroeconomic model assumption and incorporating psychological aspects of 
depositors. We explain this in section III. 
C. Individual Risk and Time Preferences
Dijk (2017) explored the role of psychological factors in withdrawal decisions 
using emotional priming. Likewise, Kiss, Rodriguez-Lara, and Rosa-Garcia (2018) 
analyze whether risk aversion, loss aversion, and other behavioral characteristics 
are correlated with withdrawal decisions. We explore the role of risk and time 
preferences in withdrawal decisions. We define risk preferences as the variation 
of individuals’ preferences across different risks. Conversely, we define time 
preferences as the way depositors make decisions between taking gains (or losses) 
now or at some point of time in the future.
In terms of risk preferences, depositors could be classified into risk averse, risk 
neutral, and risk lovers. Similarly, with regard to time preferences, depositors can 
be classified into patient and impatient depositors. The latter depositors prefer 
longer interval decisions. Time and risk preferences are negatively correlated. 
Inevitably, longer time yields higher uncertainty, hence higher risk, showing the 
inverse relationship between the two; see the works of Andreoni and Sprenger 
(2009), and Anderhub, Gueth, Gneezy, Sonsino (2001). 
III. METHODOLOGY
We interviewed a pool of 33 prime depositors (i.e. N=33). To be included in our 
sample, respondents must hold more than Rp500 million in their bank accounts; the 
33 prime depositors met this criterion. We managed to gather primary information 
on their individual microeconomic attributes, such as withdrawal decisions under 
certain scenarios, risk and time preferences, and their plans on withdrawing the 
deposits in the near or distant future, along with demographic characteristics. 
Based on the amount of deposits, the number of depositors holding Rp1 to 
Rp2 billion dominated the sample, consisting of about 67 percent of the total 
respondents. Depositors with up to Rp500 million to Rp1 billion are 24,24 percent 
of the sample, while a modest 9,09 percent of the sampled depositors had more 
than Rp2 billion, and rounds up the sample.
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A. Economic Model
We use the following logistic regression model:
Table 2. 
Amount of Savings Distribution Between Respondents
This table reports the amount of savings distributed between respondents based on the amount classification notes 
in column 1. 
Amount of Savings N Percentage
Rp 500 million to Rp 1 billion 8 24,24%
Rp 1 billion to Rp 2 billion 22 66,67%
More than Rp 2 billion 3 9,09%
(6)
where Pk denotes the probability that an individual withdraws his money 
from the bank under scenarios k, and Xi denotes the included demographic, 
microeconomic behavior, and other relevant regressors. 
B. Time and Risk Preference Elicitation
To elicit time and risk preferences, we utilized pre-defined questionnaire for the 
in-depth interviews, and this questionnaire is adapted from previous studies such 
as Meier and Sprenger (2010) and Eckel and Grossman (2002). We extract two 
variables from the interviews: X, smaller payoff in nearer future, and Y, bigger 
payoff in a more distant future. We, then, compute the individual discount factors 
by dividing X by Y (X/Y) using scalable switching points between the near and 
distant future choices. This method is adapted from the study by Meier and 
Sprenger (2010). 
To obtain the risk preferences, we used the method developed by Eckel 
and Grossman (2002), which entails asking our respondents to choose from six 
different low-high payoff choices. Each choice would suggest the nature of their 
risk preferences, and would also lie within the Constant Relative Risk Averse 
(CRRA) range (Charness, Gneezy, Imas, 2013). We, then, take the average between 
the lowest and highest implied CRRA to quantify the risk preferences. 
For robustness check, we elicited three individual discount factors from 
different time ranges, and, then, we take their averages to calculate the time 
preferences. Another robustness check regarding risk preferences is by comparing 
respondents’ answers on investment opportunities with various success 
probabilities (predetermined). To infer the θ* and θ’ (withdrawal decisions), and 
time and risk preferences more accurately, we set up four scenarios: (1) Rupiah 
weakening, (2) small bank failing, (3) own bank failing, and (4) a massive capital 
outflow from the country. 
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C. Cascade Effect under Different Scenarios
It is logical to set the withdrawal decision of someone affected by peers or someone 
else. In this paper, we calculate and internalize this ‘cascade effect,’ or peer 
withdrawal effect, that might occur during an economic shock situation leading to 
a possibility of a bank run. 
We asked respondents whether or not they will withdraw their deposits if they 
notice a certain percentage of other depositors withdrawing. In the simulation 
exercise, we took the percentage of respondents who answered that they would 
withdraw in the very first signs of an economic shock (from first analysis); then, 
we checked the threshold percentage of those claiming to not pull out under this 
shock, and compare the percentage with the former. We did the simulations for 
any additional necessary rounds until it was evident that all depositors eventually 
withdrew their deposits.
IV. RESULT AND ANALYSIS
A. Respondents’ Risk and Withdrawal Preferences
We find that 9 out of the 33 depositors claim to withdraw at near future t = 1 
(classified as Type-1). We set a time frame of one year or less as the threshold 
classifying either type. The rest claim to withdraw in a longer time horizon (t = 2). 
In proportion, the number of people claiming to withdraw in the shorter horizon 
is low (i.e. 27.27%). But recalling these people are prime depositors, withdrawing 
their money could have severe implications on bank’s solvency in Indonesia.
During the identification, we found that most prime depositors are risk averse. 
This is an alarming condition since risk-averse people tend to avoid uncertainty. 
When faced with uncertainty in the economy, these risk-averse people could 
withdraw their money from banks. We find that 24 out of the 33 prime depositors 
are self-admittedly long-term depositors, where the risk preferences are of concern.
Table 3.
 Characteristics of Depositors
This tables notes depositors’ characteristics. Type-1 category of depositors is those who will withdraw in the near 
future. Type-2 represents depositors who will withdraw over a longer time horizon. This classification is based on a 
pre-determined questionnaire that we use for in-depth interviews, as explained in Section III.
Description
Type of Depositors
Type 1 Type 2 Total
Risk Preferences
Risk Averse 8 19 25
Risk Neutral 0 4 4
Risk Lovers 1 1 2
Total 9 24 33
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B. Risk and Time Preferences under Different Scenarios
The results of the logistic regression are reported in Table 5. On big bank failing 
scenarios (see Table 5), we found a statistically significant relationship between 
withdrawal decisions and risk preferences (z=1.83; p=0.067). The result implies a 
more risk averse prime depositor is more likely to withdraw under this scenario.
Table 4. 
Amount of Deposit across Risk Preferences
This table reports the amount of deposits across risk preferences. We used a pre-determined questionnaire during 
the in-depth interviews to quantify and categorize the risk preference of prime depositors. The threshold for deposit 
amount of IDR 2 billion refers the maximum deposit covered by Indonesia Deposit Insurance Company (LPS) for 
each account.
Description Risk-averse Risk neutral Risk lovers Total
Rp 500 million – Rp 1 billion 7 1 0 8
Rp 1 billion - Rp 2 billion 18 2 2 22
> Rp 2 billion 2 1 0 3
Total 27 4 2 33
Table 5. 
Estimated Coefficients under Different Scenarios
This table reports results. The dependent is withdrawal decision. We use the logistic regression to estimate the odd 
ratio (OR). The coefficient is therefore the log odd ratio with the possible value range from −∞ to ∞. The negative 
value indicates OR ∈ [0,1], showing lower odds compared to the reference one. Time preference = individual discount 
factor. Finally, *, **, and *** represent p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively.
Withdrawal under 
Certain Scenarios
Extreme 
Weakening of 
Rupiah
One Big 
Bank Failure
Massive 
Capital 
Outflow
50% Chance Own 
Bank Failing
Risk Preferences 1.44** 12.76* 1.13 *** -1.88 **
Time Preferences 11.29* 1.41 1.52 ** 0.58 
Log of Amount of 
Savings
1.24 2.065 7.24 *** 38.845 *
Constant -34.84 -30.82 -38.55 *** -28.96
We found similar results in the case of extreme weakening of the Rupiah. The 
risk preference (z=2.18; p=0.029) and time preference (z=1.72; p=0.085) are positively 
associated with withdrawal decisions. In this scenario, the more risk-averse the 
depositors, the more likely they will withdraw. Furthermore, even the patient 
depositors (the ones with larger time preferences) will also withdraw when the 
Rupiah largely depreciates against other currencies (USD in this case). 
Under 50% chance of own bank failing, risk preference is found to be significant 
(i.e. z=-2.10; p=0.036).1 The finding, in this case, is different from the other scenarios 
as the less risk-averse depositors are the ones more likely to withdraw when own 
bank is failing. The amount of savings is also significant suggesting that prime 
depositors with more deposits are likelier to withdraw (z=1.78; p=0.075). This is 
logical as a higher amount of money is at stake under the scenario.
1 Negative log odd ratio (-2.1) shows that the odds of the risk averse depositors are lower than the 
odds of the reference category (risk lover).
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In our last scenario, all our variables of interest are significant. Risk preference 
(z=2.24; p=0.025) and time preferences (z=2.18; p=0.030), along with the amount of 
savings (z=1.91; p=0.056), show a strong relationship with withdrawal decisions. 
More risk averse and patient prime depositors are again found to be likelier to 
withdraw under the shock. Prime depositors with a higher amount of savings are 
also implied to make a similar decision. 
C. Cascade Effect under Different Scenarios
We simulate the cascade effect under various economic scenarios and report these 
results in Table 6. The severity of one small bank failing and the Rupiah exceeding 
Rp15,000/USD has moderate to no cascade effect. This means the shock would not 
lead to a bank run. In contrast, cascade effect is evident in the other 3 scenarios 
(1 big bank fail, 1 government bank fail, and the Rupiah highly depreciate from 
Rp17,000 to Rp20,000 per USD). 
Table 6.
Cascade Effect on Bank Run’s across Certain Idiosyncratic Scenarios
This table reports cascade effects on bank runs across certain idiosyncratic scenarios. The scenarios are reported in 
column 1, verdict appears in column 2, and the percentage of withdrawal is noted in the 3rd column.
Case Verdict Percent of Withdrawal Time
1 Small Bank fails No Run 6.06% withdrawal (at most) -
1 Big Bank fails Run 54.54%; 93.93 %; 100 % 3 rounds
1 BUMN Bank fails Run 84.84%; 100% 2 rounds
Rupiah to Rp15,000/USD No Run 18,18% withdrawal (at most) -
Rupiah to Rp17,000/USD Run 48.49%; 75.76%; 100% 3 rounds
Rupiah to Rp20,000/USD Run 54.54%; 87.88%; 100% 3 rounds
Putting the results together, we found that risk and time preferences alongside 
the amount of savings are important determinants of withdrawal decisions, and, 
in turn, bank runs. We expect that our findings would spur further experimental 
research in the long-running literature of bank runs (see Chen & Hasan, 2008; 
Diamond & Dybvig, 1983), along with those discussing the role of risk and time 
preferences on economic decisions (see Arrow, 1965; Frederick, Loewenstein, 
& O’Donoghue, 2002; Friend, 1977). Aside providing trivial evidence about the 
presence of “bad-equilibrium”, we also show how bad noises and signals affect 
the possibility of bank runs (see Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005). Regarding the 
behavioral aspects, our results suggest that risk and time preferences matter for 
withdrawal decisions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper analyzes the effect of risk and time preferences, and the amount of 
saving on withdrawal decisions, and, in turn, the probability of bank runs. Using 
direct in-depth interviews with prime depositors in Indonesia, we unravel three 
interesting findings. First, prime depositors and make long-term withdrawal 
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decisions. Second, prime depositors are risk averse, and are thus likely to 
withdraw their money under duress conditions. Third, risk and time preferences 
significantly affect the withdrawal decisions of prime depositors. 
These findings should be considered by policymakers, particularly the Bank 
Indonesia, Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK), Lembaga Penjamin Simpanan (LPS), and the 
Ministry of Finance. We encourage policymakers to use our model when assessing 
the banking system’s susceptibility to bank runs. 
Finally, our findings should be interpreted by taking into consideration our 
small sample size. We argue that future studies should seek to expand our sample 
in order to better understand the dynamics of bank runs in Indonesia. Indonesia 
relies heavily on prime depositors, and as such these depositors would be virtually 
available to be interviewed nationwide. Thus, national scale surveys should seek 
to cover these depositors. 
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